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Abstract— The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly increasing the number of connected devices. This causes 
new concerns towards solutions for authenticating numerous IoT devices. Most of these devices are 
resource-constrained. Therefore, the use of long-secret keys, in traditional cryptography schemes can be 
hard to implement. Also, the key generation, distribution, and storage are very complex. Moreover, the goal 
of many reported cyber-attacks is accessing the key. Therefore, researchers have shown an increased 
interest in designing keyless encryption schemes recently. In this report, we are going to explain the details 
of the implementation of the keyless protocol by taking advantage of known technology modules such as 
microcontrollers (MCU), and hash functions.  
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been used in many cryptographic applications such as 
Password Management Systems, key exchange, Key Generation. In this report, we are going to explain the 
details of the hardware implementation of keyless encryption in the MCU. Different kinds of memristors 
have been used in the past. In this work, a look-up-table containing memristor cells value at the various 
current levels is used since the physical component is unavailable yet. The hardware that is used to 
implement the system is an evaluation-board of SAMV71 MCU, which is used to implement the control 
system and hardware hashing.  
 
Introduction 
PUFs have been used in many cryptographic applications such as Password Management Systems [1-6], 
key exchange [7], Key Generation [8], Power Storage [9-13] and communication [14]. In this report, we 
are going to explain the details of the implementation of keyless encryption based on SHA256 in the 
microcontrollers and image of memristors. Different kind of memristor exists now such as MRAMs [15]. 
Memristor is used as one of the cryptography parts, but we use a look-up-table containing memristor cells 
value at the different current level because the physical component is unavailable yet. The hardware used 
to implement the system is an eval-board of SAMV71 MCU which is used to implement the control system 
and hardware hashing. Some steps of the encryption and decryption process are the same and described in 
the incoming section. 
The sender side which encrypts the message and receiver side which decrypt the message use the same RN 
(Random Number) for each message and share this for every message which is called handshake. Also, 
both sides use the same password for all the cryptography and share the password in a safe environment at 
the beginning. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 shows the keyless encryption and decryption protocol respectively. The 
code written for simulation, and the results of each step is provided in the next sections. The hardware used 
to implement the system is an eval- board of SAMV71 microcontoroller (MCU) which is used to implement 
the control system and hardware hashing. The evaluation board is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 1: encryption process steps 
 
Figure 2: decryption process steps 
 
Figure 3: The evaluation board used to implement the keyless protocol 
1.1. Similar steps 
Since the keyless encryption and decryption protocol is implemented on the MCU, the similar steps between 
encryption and decryption are done once at the beginning of the process. XORing, hashing, rotating, 
creating long MD and extracting the address, current and order arrays are similar steps. 
1.1.1. Generating Long message digest 
After handshaking, both parties have the same PW and RN. As it is shown in Fig. 1, at the sender side, 
Exclusive or (XOR) of ID and PW (ID⊕PW) is calculated. Two modes are considered for password. The 
first one is using the saved password, and the second one is entering the password. The second one is just 
considered to check the results of the code on the MCU with the results of the code developed by software 
students. Furthermore, three modes are considered for RN: using saved RN, entering a new RN and 
generating RN by the hardware engine. Fig. 3. shows the considered cases for password and random 
number.  
 
Figure 4: Considered cases for password and random number 
In the next step, the hash of (ID⊕PW), h(ID⊕PW), generates the digest. The output of the hash digest is 
32 bytes. The left two most significant bytes of the digest is rotated sixteen times, and every time the result 
is fed into a hash function, and the resulting digest is saved. The longer message digest is 512 bytes which 
are the assembly of 16 digests. Rotating, hashing and generating long MD is done in blow code. Local_var 
containing two most significant bytes of MD is rotated at each iteration, except at first, and update the 
sw_digest message and hashing again.  
for (i_counter = 0; i_counter < 16; i_counter++) 
 { 
  if(i_counter) 
  { 
   local_var = (local_var << 1) | (local_var >> 15);// rotating 
   sw_digest[0] = (local_var >> 8) & 0XFF; 
   sw_digest[1] = (local_var & 0XFF); 
  } 
  Sha256Calculate(sw_digest, MSG_SIZE, temp_second_hash); 
  for(j_count = 0; j_count < MSG_SIZE; j_count++)  // create long MD 
  { 
   lmd[i_counter * MSG_SIZE + j_count] = temp_second_hash[j_count]; 
  } 
 } 
Fig. 4. shows the results of shifting and hashing 16 times. In this figure, the first two bytes are shown in the 
binary format. This can show more clearly how 16 inputs of hash functions are created by rotating the first 
two bytes. The results shown in Fig. 4 is obtained after entering “Keyless” as the plain test. 
 
Figure 5: Results of 16 times shifting and hashing 
1.1.2. Extract Address, current and order 
The long MD is divided into n blocks each containing address, current and order. In this implementation 
the address and order are 7bit and current is 3 bit and in total each block is 17 bits. The whole 16*32 bytes 
of long MD can be used to generate 16*32*8/17 blocks which is equal to 240. 
The address and current are used to access to a particular position in the memristor resistance table which 
corresponds to the reading of a particular position in the memristor at a certain current level. The order 
arrayis used later to reorder to cipher. 
1.2. Encryption 
The first step in the encryption process is dividing binary representation of the plain text in 4bit blocks 
which is called Qi. Then the values read from Look-up table which is called 𝑅௪,௜ and Qi are fed to a block 
which applies a formula and generates the transit cipher 𝐶ᇱ. 
The applied formula is 𝐶ᇱ = 𝑅௪,௜(1 + 𝐾𝑄௜)  and K is equal to 0.2 and constant. The K value is set 0.2 so 
that the generated ciphers be different enough. The first element of the 𝐶ᇱ is obtained using 𝐶ᇱ = 𝑅௪,௜(1 +
7.5𝑄௜) which is needed for calibration purpose. Fig. 5. Shows the decimal value of the plaintext blocks and 
transit cipher.  
Calculating the first element of transit cipher and rest of 𝐶ᇱ elements are calculated in the below code: 
info_struct[0].transit_cipher = memres_value[0] * (1 + 7.5 * K); 
for(i_counter = 1; i_counter < 2*plain_text_size+1; i_counter++) 
 { 
info_struct[i_counter].transit_cipher = memres_value[i_counter] * (1 + K * 
plain_buff[i_counter-1]); // C` = Rw,i*(1+K*Qw,i) 
 } 
 
Figure 6: Decimal Value of plaintext blocks and transit cipher 
In the last step, the transit cipher is reordered in corresponding to order array when order array is sorting. 
The output of this reordering step is final cipher 𝐶. Fig. 6. shows how the final cipher is extracted from 
transit cipher using set of orders.  
 
Figure 7: Extracting the final cipher from transit cipher using set of orders 
In order to manage well data and to deal with arrays during sorting we packed the address, order, current 
and generated transit cipher are packed into structures. Below we use this structure to sort the array and 
corresponding reordering the transit ciphers: 
info_struct_t temp_cipher; 
for(i_counter = 2*plain_text_size; i_counter ; i_counter--) 
{ 
 for(j = 0; j < i_counter; j++) 
 { 
  if(info_struct[j].order > info_struct[j+1].order) 
  { 
   temp_cipher = info_struct[j]; 
   info_struct[j] = info_struct[j+1]; 
   info_struct[j+1] = temp_cipher; 
  } 
 } 
} 
1.3. Decryption 
Since set of orders (bw,i) is needed in the decryption, bw,i is saved in a separate array named original_order.  
The first step in the decryption process is to create a helper index array (HIA). First, the value of HIA is 
[0,1,2,…,N-2,N-1] where N is the size of the plaintext. In the second step, we sort bw,I array and reorder 
the HIA corresponding to bw,i. Now the orders of HIA and 𝐶 are changed in the same manner. We sort the 
HIA and reorder the 𝐶 to get the transit cipher 𝐶ᇱ.  
for(i_counter = 2*plain_text_size; i_counter ; i_counter--) 
{ 
 for(j = 0; j < i_counter; j++) 
 { 
  if(helperindexarray[j] > helperindexarray[j+1]) 
  { 
   temp_order = helperindexarray[j]; 
   helperindexarray[j] = helperindexarray[j+1]; 
   helperindexarray[j+1] = temp_order; 
   temp_cipher = info_struct[j]; 
   info_struct[j] = info_struct[j+1]; 
   info_struct[j+1] = temp_cipher; 
  } 
 } 
} 
The third step is to apply the inverse of the formula which wasused in encryption process. The invers 
formula will take the transit cipher 𝐶ᇱ and output the 4bit blocks of plain text. The Invers formula is 𝑄௜ =
(𝐶ᇱ/𝑅௪,௜ − 1)/𝐾 and applies to 𝐶ᇱ element except the first one which was used for calibration. 
The below code shows how we get the 4bit blocks of plain text. One important note in this step that 
should be considered is that because of dividing floating point number the result may not be real numbers 
as we expect. We round the output of the inverse formula using roundf function. 
for(i_counter = 1; i_counter < 2*plain_text_size+1; i_counter++) 
{ 
local_plain_buff[i_counter-1] = roundf((info_struct[i_counter].transit_cipher / 
memres_value[i_counter] - 1) / K); // Qw,i = (C / Rw,i - 1) / K 
} 
And the final step is concatenating the 4bit blocks to obtain the original plain text. 
for(i_counter = 0; i_counter < 2*plain_text_size; i_counter+=2) 
{ 
 local_plain_text[i_counter/2] = (local_plain_buff[i_counter] << 4) | 
local_plain_buff[i_counter+1]; 
} 
The results of this section is shown in Fig. 7. 
 Figure 8: Retrieving the plaintext from the cipher 
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